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Abstract 
How does concern for consumption relative to others (”relativity”) affect the progressivity 
of the optimal income tax structure? In this paper we revisit this literature and present a 
more detailed analysis of the solution to the non-linear income tax problem with 
consumption interdependence than is currently available, generalizing some results and 
developing other results for cases with special objective functions and special distributions, 
as well as numerical simulations. Of particular interest for us is the interplay between 
inequality and relativity in determining the optimal tax schedule. We find support for 
greater progressivity in the tax structure as relative concern increases. But our numerical 
calculations show that this incremental impact is less at higher levels of inequality. We also 
explore what happens when the government does not accept the relative concerns of 
individuals and maximizes a non-welfarist objective function.   
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Andrew Oswald and participants at the SIRE – Cornell conference on Relativity, 
Inequality and Public Policy Edinburgh, 2009 for very useful comments and suggestions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is growing empirical evidence that the assumption that individual preferences are 
independent, in the sense that people do not want things because others want them, may not 
be entirely appropriate.2 The major alternative to this assumption is that an individual’s 
well-being depends on his or her relative consumption – how it compares to the 
consumption of others.  This “relativity” idea is not new of course. More than one hundred 
years ago Thorsten Veblen3 maintained that consumption is motivated by a desire for social 
standing as well as for enjoyment of the goods and services per se. This implies that people 
compare consumption not leisure.4
There are few papers asking these questions in an optimal nonlinear income tax framework 
inspired by Mirrlees (1971)
  
 
Relative consumption (income) concern or status seeking creates negative externalities 
because gains in one’s status reduce someone else’s. If these externalities are important as 
empirical research seems to suggest, taxing consumption externalities might be welfare 
enhancing just in the same way as any other Pigouvian tax. This simple intuition does not 
tell us anything about the detailed effects of relative income concern on the tax schedule. 
Do status considerations lead to a more progressive tax system or a less progressive tax 
system? Is income tax an effective tool for reducing inequalities and attenuating possible 
externalities arising from relative income concerns? How does inequality and relativity 
together determine the shape of the optimal tax schedule? 
 
5--see Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990), Ireland (2001)6
                                                 
2 Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) provide a good survey. 
3 Later on Duesenberry (1949), Galbraith (1958), Hirsch (1976) and Frank (1985, 1997) among others have 
written about the importance of relative position as a dominant spending motivation. 
4 More recent empirical research findings show that relative consumption concerns have important effects on 
consumption but little, if any, on leisure (Clark and Oswald, 1996). 
5 Aronsson-Johansson-Stenman (2008) address public good provision in this framework. 
6 Boskin-Sheshinski (1978) and Blomquist (1993) consider linear income tax policy with relative 
consumption. Bowles and Park (2005) consider a simple two-class tax model. Their model takes each 
individual’s reference consumption to be exogenous.  
 
. In this 
paper we revisit these questions and extend the earlier work in the literature. We present a 
more detailed analysis of the solution to the non-linear income tax problem with 
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consumption interdependence, including cases with special objective functions and special 
distributions, as well as numerical simulations. Of particular interest for us is the interplay 
between inequality and relativity in determining the optimal tax schedule. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 presents the optimal income tax model with 
relative consumption concern. In Section 3 we consider implications of relative concern in 
the optimal nonlinear income tax model with Rawlsian and Rank-order social objectives 
and with special distributional assumptions on preferences. Section 4 presents numerical 
simulations in the Utilitarian case. Section 5 elaborates on the interplay between relativity 
and inequality in determining optimal tax rates. Section 6 explores what happens when the 
government does not accept the relative concerns of individuals and maximizes a non-
welfarist objective function. Section 7 discusses and concludes the results in the broader 
context of optimal taxation and behavioural public economics. 
 
2. Optimal non linear taxation and relative consumption concern 
 
Do people make comparisons between or among individuals of similar incomes? Or is the 
lifestyle of the upper middle class and the rich a more salient point of reference for people 
throughout the income distribution? A comparison consumption level can be constructed as 
follows. Let x denote consumption, and let 
  ( ) ( ) ( )n x n f n dnµ ω= ∫        (1) 
where a distribution of wages (productivities), denoted by n, on the interval (0, ∞) is 
represented by the density function f(n). There are a number of alternative interpretations of 
the variable μ. The simplest one is obtained if each of the ω weight is equal to one. In this case 
the average consumption is the comparison consumption level. We can choose the weights ω 
so that μ is the consumption of the richest individual (this corresponds to Veblen’s idea), of 
the median individual or something in between the richest and the median.  It is difficult to say 
without empirical evidence which is the most plausible interpretation. Moreover, as Layard 
(1980) suggests, that people may have different μ values. In this paper, we restrict attention to 
the case where ω=1 for all n so that μ is the average consumption of people in the economy. 
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We consider a one period model with labour as the only source of income. There is a 
continuum of individuals, each having the same preference ordering, which is represented by 
an additive utility function  
  ( ) ( ) ( )u U x V yψ µ= + −   (2) 
where x is a composite consumption good, μ is a comparison consumption level, and hours 
worked are y, with Ux > 0, ( )0µψ < >  and Vy < 0 (subscripts indicating partial derivatives) and 
where V(.)  is convex.  As typical in optimal tax literature, we have to make simplifying 
assumption like this separability assumption to be able make progress in our understanding of 
the optimal schedules. Workers differ only in the pre-tax wage n they can earn. Gross income   
z ny=   (3) 
and consumption, x, is after-tax income. 
                                                                   
Suppose that the aim of policy can be expressed as maximizing the following social welfare 
criterion 
  
0
( ( )) ( )S W u n f n dn
∞
= ∫        (4) 
where W(.) is an increasing and concave function of utility.  
 
We should note before moving on that there are many difficult problems with formulation of 
the social welfare function. For example, we must decide whether the government ought to 
accept relative income concerns in social welfare. This is closely related to the awkward 
question of whether we should include antisocial preferences such as envy, malice etc. in 
social welfare function or not. If so, it would be important to consider the case where the 
government is “non-welfarist” (paternalistic). But it could be argued that to the extent 
relative concerns or Veblen effects are real, it should be respected when evaluating social 
welfare.7
                                                 
7 Examples of the first include Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004), while 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003), Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and McCaffery and Slemrod (2006) are 
examples of the latter.  See Seade (1980) for seminal work. 
 In this paper we follow the latter, “welfarist”, route. 
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The government cannot observe individuals’ productivities and thus is restricted to setting 
taxes and transfers as a function only of earnings, ( ( ))T z n . The government maximizes S 
subject to the revenue constraint 
  
0
( ( )) ( )T z n f n dn R
∞
=∫       (5) 
where in the Mirrlees tradition R is interpreted as the required revenue for essential public 
goods. The more non-tax revenue a government receives from external sources, the lower 
is R. 
           
Totally differentiating utility with respect to n , and making use of workers utility 
maximization condition, we obtain the incentive compatibility constraints, 
  y
yVdu g
dn n
= − = .8
T ny x= −
                                                                                 (6) 
Since , we can think of government as choosing schedules )(nx , )(ny  and μ. In 
fact it is easier to think of it choosing a pair of functions, )(nu , )(ny  and μ, which maximize 
welfare index (4) subject to the revenue requirement (5), the incentive compatibility condition 
(6) and the comparison condition (1). We focus on the case where ω=1 for all n so that μ is the 
average consumption of people in the economy. Introducing Lagrange multipliers λ, α(n) and 
γ  for the constraints (5), (6) and (1) and integrating by parts, the Lagrangean becomes 
0
[( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) ' ] ( ) ( ) (0 )(0 )L W u ny x f n xf u g dn u uλ γ µ α α α α
∞
= + − + − − − + ∞ ∞ −∫  (7) 
Differentiating with respect to u, y and μ gives the first-order conditions9
[ ' ( )] ( ) '( ) 0u uL W h f n nλ γ α= − + − =
  
                                                       (8) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0y y y y yyL n h f n h f n n V yVλ γ α= − − + + =                                (9) 
                                                 
8 The 1.order condition of individual’s optimisation problem is only a necessary condition for the individual's 
choice to be optimal, but we assume here that it is sufficient as well. Assumptions that assure sufficiency are 
provided by Mirrlees (1976). Note also that while we here presume an internal solution for y, (6) remains valid 
even if individuals were bunched at y=0 since, for them / 0du dn = . 
9 Inverting utility we have ( , , )x h u y µ=  and calculating  the derivatives        
/ , 1/ , /y y x x x xh V U h U h Uµ µψ= − = = −  
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  ( ) ( ) 0L h f n dn h f n dnµ µ µλ γ γ= − + − =∫ ∫                                             (10) 
(10) implies 
( )
1 ( )
h f n dn
h f n dn
µ
µ
γ
λ
=
−
∫
∫
                                                                          (11) 
(8) satisfies the transversality conditions  
  (0 )0; ( ) 0
(0) ( )
L L
u u
α α∂ ∂= = = ∞ =
∂ ∂ ∞
                                                                                                                                    
and 
  0)( >nµ , for  (0, )n∈ ∞ ,                                                                                    
Integrating in (8)10
( )( ) [ ' ] ( )
xn
n W f p dp
u
λ γα
∞ +
= −∫
 
                                                               (12) 
From the first order conditions of government’s maximization, we obtain the following 
condition for optimal marginal tax rate ( ) '( )t z T z= ; [Note: 1 1 1
1 1
x
Y
U nt
t t V
= − = −
− −
 ] 
  ( )( ) [ '] ( )
1 ( )
x
xn
Ut W f p dp
t nf n U
γ λ γζ
λ λ
∞ +
= + −
− ∫                   (13)                
where 1 yy
y
yV
V
ζ = + . 
It is worth noting that the so called end-point results do not hold any more. From (13) and 
the transversality conditions ( ) ( ) 0oα α= ∞ =  the marginal tax rates are positive at the both 
ends when 0µψ <  (see Oswald, 1983). This is also true with other comparators. Going 
beyond average consumption. As shown in Tuomala (1990) the separability assumption 
used in Oswald (1983) can be weakened so that μ affects individuals’ choices. 
                                                 
10 Integrating in (8)  
               
0
( ) (0)
n d dn n
dn
α α α= −∫  
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Unfortunately we are not able to say more on the shape of tax schedule with the weaker 
separability condition.  
 
Multiplying and dividing (13) by (1 ( ))F n− we can to write the formula for marginal rates;                         
                                                                                                                    
[ ]
( )
( )
' (1 / )[1 ] ( )
1 ( ) (1 / )1
1 ( ) (1 ( ))c
n n
n
p
x
x pu
xn
A B
C
W UU f p dp
F n Ut E
t nf n F nE
γ λ
λ γ λγ
λ
∞ +
−  − + +  = +     − −     
 
∫



      (14)                              
where  uE  is the uncompensated supply of labour and cE  in turn is the compensated 
elasticity.11
 
 
 
The first term on the right hand side of (14) for the marginal income tax rate is analogous 
to a Pigouvian tax correcting for an externality. It could also be called a first-best motive 
for taxation, as it corrects the individual activity to correspond to social preferences. From 
(14), there are in addition to the externality term three elements on the right hand side of 
(14) that determine optimum tax rates: elasticity and income effects (A&C), the shape of the 
skill distribution (B&C) and social marginal weights (C). B is a measure of relative the size of 
the taxpayers at that level and above it. The C-term in (6) is a measure of the social cost of 
taking an euro away from everyone above that skill. C tends to favour rising marginal rates. 
Especially this is so when income is low or moderate. 
 
On the basis of (14) we can also notice that if the utility of individuals depends negatively on 
the comparison consumption the marginal tax rate of the highest income is positive.  
                                                 
11Differentiating the FOC  of the individual maximization, (1 ) 0x yU n t V− + = ,  with respect to net wage, 
labour supply and virtual income, b ,  we have after some manipulation elasticity formulas; 
xxxyyy
xxxyyu
UUVV
UUVyV
E
2
2
)/(
)/()/(
+
−
=   , (income effect parameter)   
xxxyyy
xxxy
UUVV
UUV
I 2
2
)/(
)/(
+
−
=     ,  and from the 
Slutsky equation  IEE uc −= , then  
xxxyyy
yc
UUVV
yV
E 2)/(
)/(
+
= .     
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It should however be clear from (14) that the variation of the optimal marginal tax rate with 
the level of income is a complex matter.  It is clear that explicit solutions to the optimal 
income tax problem are difficult to obtain without simplifying assumptions. The terms in 
(14) simplify if we assume, as in Atkinson (1995) and Diamond (1998), quasi-linear 
preferences with 1xU = . The marginal tax rate formula then reduces to: 
 
[ ]
'[1 ](1 / ) ( )
1 ( ) (1 / )11
1 ( ) (1 ( ))c
n
n
n
n
A B
C
W f p dp
F nt
t nf n F nE
γ λ
λ γ λγ
λ
∞ 
− +  − +   = + +     − −     
 
∫



      (15) 
But this is still too complex, with a number of different influences in play, to allow useful 
interpretation. We turn therefore to further assumptions, on the government’s objective 
function and on the distribution of n, to provide further insights. 
 
3. Quasi linear preferences 
3.1. The Rawlsian case  
 
If we assume the Rawlsian social objective12

1 1 ( )1 (1 )
1 ( )
nn n
c
CA B
t F n
t E nf n
γ γ
λ λ
 − = + + +  −    


 then the factor Cn in (14) is constant. Then the 
pattern of marginal tax rates depends only on B, that is, on the shape of the n-distribution:  
               (16) 
We specify further the case with a maximin criterion so that the upper part of the n-
distribution is the unbounded Pareto distribution, 1
1( ) af n n +
=  for a>0, and the utility 
function is 
11
u x x y εϕ
+
= − −  
Then using (11) we have ( C uE E ε= = ) 
                                                 
12 Maximizing utility of worst off person in the society is not the original version of Rawls (1972). It is a kind 
of welfarist version of Rawlsian. “To interpret the difference principle as the principle of maximin utility (the 
principle to maximize the well-being of the least advantaged person) is a serious misunderstanding from a 
philosophical standpoint.” Rawls,1982) 
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  1 11 [1 ]
1
t
t a
φ φ
ε
 = + + + −  
                                             (17) 
where 
1
ϕφ
ϕ
=
−
. 
Hence using the Rawlsian social welfare function we do not obtain the rising part of the U-
shaped marginal tax rates as in Diamond (1998).13
( )T z k zτ= +
  
 
Proposition 1.  The optimal top marginal tax rate depends negatively on a, which is a 
measure of the thinness of the tail of the Pareto distribution, and it is decreasing in є. 
Finally, it is increasing in φ, which measures the importance of relativity in this 
framework. 
  
We illustrate numerically marginal rates in the following tables. The table 1 presents the 
marginal tax rates for parameter value when a=2 and 3, φ =0 and 1/2 and є=1/3, ½ and 1.  
                                
Table 1 shows how the top marginal tax rate decreases when the elasticity of labour supply 
є increases, the Pareto parameter a increases and the degree of relative consumption 
concern declines.  The results in Table 1 depend on the chosen distribution of wages.  
 
If the whole distribution of wages is an unbounded Pareto distribution, then optimal 
marginal tax rates are constant and positive. This implies that the optimal tax function is 
linear 
                                                          (18) 
The average tax rate is  
  ( )T z k t
z z
= +                                                                                      (19) 
where 
1
bt
b
=
+
 is between zero and one and where 1 11 [1 ]b
a
φ φ
ε
 = + + +  
. 
 
                                                 
13 In the general additive case with maximin, C   is ( ( ) / )xf p U dp∫ . It is declining with n since u(x) is 
concave and the intergral term declines in n. This might suggest declining marginal rates. 
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Equation (19) implies that average tax rates are increasing if and only if k is negative. If 
preferences are quasi-linear in consumption and the distribution of n is an unbounded 
Pareto distribution, a maxi-min criterion implies increasing average tax rates in income. 
When the elasticity of labour supply is not constant, the problem becomes more 
complicated. Then it is not possible without simulations to say anything about the shape of 
tax schedule. 
 
We now consider two alternatives to the Pareto distribution: (i) the Champernowne (1952) 
distribution and (ii) the lognormal distribution (with parameters m and σ (see Aitchison and 
Brown, 1957)14
1
2( ) ( )( )
m nf n
m n
θ θ
θ θθ
−
=
+
). As is well known, the lognormal distribution fits reasonable well over a 
large part of income range but diverges markedly at the both tails. The Pareto distribution 
in turn fits well at the upper tail. Champernowne (1952) proposes a model in which 
individual incomes ARE assumed to follow a random walk in the logarithmic scale. Here 
we use the two parameter version of the Champernowne distribution. This distribution 
approaches asymptotically a form of Pareto distribution for large values of wages but it 
also has an interior maximum.  As for the lognormal, the Champernowne distribution 
exhibits the following features: asymmetry, a left humpback and long right-hand tail; but it 
has a thicker upper tail than in the lognormal case.  
 
The probability density function of the Champernowne distribution is 
                                                             (20)                                             
in which θ is a shape parameter and m is a scale parameter. The cumulative distribution 
function is 
  ( ) 1
( )
mF n
m n
θ
θ θ= − +
                                                                      (21)                                      
 For the distribution ratio: 
  1 ( ) 1lim lim
( )n n
F n m n
nf n n
θ θ
θθ θ→∞ →∞
− +
= → .                                        (22)                      
                                                 
14 2( ; , )Ln n m σ  with support [0,∞). The first parameter m is log of the median and the second parameter is 
the variance of log wage. The latter one is itself an inequality measure. 
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Eq (22) confirms that the Champernowne distribution approaches asymptotically a form of 
Pareto distribution for large values of wages. 
Calculating the inverse hazard ratio or Mills ratio 1 ( )
( )
F n
nf n
−  for Champernowne distribution 
(with different parameter values of θ= 2 and 3 and m=e-1) and lognormal distribution (with 
different parameter values of σ= 0.39 and 0.7 and m=e-1, see Figure 1a and b) we obtain 
from (16) the marginal tax rates with the Rawlsian case. The results are shown for different 
percentile points of the distribution. 
  
Note that these (in Tables 1, 2 and 3) are marginal rates for all taxes that vary with income, 
and should be compared with the schedules for total of taxes on income and expenditures in 
real economies. From Tables 2 and 3 we can see that the marginal tax rates decrease with 
labour supply elasticities as expected. We also see that marginal tax rates are throughout 
much lower for lognormal case than for the Champernowne distribution. In other words the 
choice of the functional form of the n-distribution matters greatly. The results in Tables 2 
and 3 again confirm that zero is a poor approximation even for the top 0.1 per cent. Finally 
and most importantly from our point of view, as the degree of relative consumption 
concern increases, (i) marginal tax rates increase throughout, (ii) they increase more at 
higher levels of income and (iii) with the result that the fall off of marginal tax rates is less 
steep, and in this sense the tax structure is more progressive.  
 
3.2  The Sen social welfare function 
                                                                                                                                                          
The Rawlsian objective embodies extreme inequality aversion. What happens at more 
moderate levels of inequality aversion? Suppose that the aim of policy can be expressed as 
maximizing the following rank dependent social welfare criterion 
  
0
2 (1 ) ( ) ( )W F u n f n dn
∞
= −∫                                                           (23)                                                                       
where the social marginal valuation, 2(1 )F− , declines according to the ranking in the n-
distribution. This is in effect the weighting underlying the Gini coefficient, as shown by 
Sen (1974) who provided an axiomatic justification for such a social welfare function. The 
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social marginal valuation declines linearly with F from twice the average for the lowest 
paid taxpayer to approach to zero when n goes to infinity. The marginal tax rate formula is 
  

1 1 ( )1 (1 ) ( )
1 ( )
nn n
c
CA B
t F n F n
t E nf n
γ γ
λ λ
 − = + + +  −    


                           (24) 
From (24) we see that when n tends to infinity the Rawlsian and rank order marginal tax 
rates coincide. As with the Rawlsian social objectives15
The special cases considered in the previous section yield insights but within the framework of 
the assumptions made. How robust are these insights? What happens when we move away 
from quasi-linearity? This section presents optimal tax schedules with alternative assumptions. 
Our simulations are performed for the strict utilitarian case
 we see from (24) that the pattern of 
marginal tax rates depend at the same way on the shape of n-distribution, є and φ.  So the 
proposition 1 holds for this case, too. 
 
4.  The Utilitarian case with income effects 
 
16
log log log(1 )xU x yϕ
µ
= + + −
. For distribution, we assume 
that f(n) is lognormal density (m,σ) (mean, stand dev.)  We further move away from quasi-
linearity and use the following utility function 
                                                    (25) 
where µ is the comparison consumption level, φ is a degree of relative income concern. Of 
course, the form in (25) restricts the range of the elasticity of labour supply. It is important 
to note that (25) does not only affect directly individuals utility levels but it also has 
behavioural effects, namely, relativity concerns (φ)  can change an individual’s marginal 
rate of substitution between consumption and labour supply. This can be seen from 
individuals utility maximization condition; /(1 )(1 ) 1x y tϕ+ − = − .  
                                                 
15 Maximizing utility of worst off person in the society is not the original version of Rawls (1972). It is a kind 
of welfarist version of Rawlsian. “To interpret the difference principle as the principle of maximin utility (the 
principle to maximize the well-being of the least advantaged person) is a serious misunderstanding from a 
philosophical standpoint.” Rawls,1982) 
16 Through a utilitarian social welfare function with constant absolute utility-inequality aversion:     1( ) uW u e β
β
−= −                                                                                                                                                     
where β  measures the degree of inequality aversion (in the case of 0=β , we define uW = ). 
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The empirical research on relativity (status) also employs the log-linear specification as in 
(25) (see Clark et al 2008 eqs (2) and (4)). One of the key findings of this research is that 
the estimated coefficient on income (consumption) and income comparison are statistically 
almost equal and opposite. (See e.g. Clark and Oswald (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2004), Luttmer (2005). This finding is robust to variety of controls and highly statistically 
significant. Thus, relative consumption matters approximately as much as own 
consumption; an Euro of increased consumption increases utility about the same amount an 
Euro reduction in average consumption in the society. Hence relative income is close a zero 
sum game. 
 
The optimal tax schedules are calculated numerically. The results of the simulations are 
summarized below in Tables 4-8. In these Tables, R (or X/Z) is revenue requirement (R=0 
means pure redistributive system), ATR is average tax rate and MTR is marginal tax rate. 
The Tables give labour supply, y , gross income, z , net income, x  and optimal average 
(ATR) and marginal tax rates (MTR) at various percentiles of the ability distribution. The 
Tables also provide the decile ratio (P90/P10) ((P90/P50)) for net income and gross income 
and the ratio between the guaranteed income x(n0)17
Several patterns emerge from the simulations presented here, focusing specifically on the 
impact of relativity on progressivity. As the parameter φ increases, (i) marginal tax rates 
increase at all levels of income, (ii) the drop off in marginal tax rates for higher income 
levels is mitigated, and (iii) our redistribution measure, RD, increases. The case for greater 
progressivity in the tax schedule, in these senses, comes through in the cases examined 
 and median income. Since marginal 
tax rates may be a poor indication of the redistribution powers of an optimal tax structure 
we measure the extent of redistribution, denoted by RD, as the proportional reduction 
between the decile ratio for market income, z, and the decile ratio for disposable income, x. 
Tables 4-8 give comparisons as  φ and σ vary. Figures 2 -6 show marginal tax rates for 
different parameters. 
 
                                                 
17 There is a critical n0 such that ( ) 0y n =   for 0n n≤   and  ( ) 0y n >   for 0n n> . 
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here—it is not just a property of the Rawlsian objective function, nor restricted to the 
Pareto or the Champernowne distributions. 
 
To further examine how sensitive the shape of the tax schedule and working hours are to 
the choice of the parameter φ in the utility function and inherent inequality we computed 
solutions for φ=1.0 and 3.0 in the case of the utility function (25) and σ =0.5 and 0.7 in the 
lognormal distribution (shown in Figures 3 -6) and θ=2 and 3 in the Champernowne 
distribution (see Table 9 and 10).  We find that when φ and inherent inequality increase the 
marginal tax rates are higher and increasing with income up to around F(n)=0.99.  These 
results reinforce the findings of Kanbur - Tuomala (1994) that when higher values of 
inherent inequality are used optimal marginal tax rates increase with the income over the 
majority of the population. It turns out that when we increase φ, individuals above the 
median work more in order to retain their relative position. Individuals of low incomes in 
turn reduce labour supply when both φ and σ increase. This is not surprising. Given that 
relative high marginal tax rates are optimal near the bottom and the guaranteed incomes, 
x(n0), are higher, individuals of low income are unlikely to find work worthwhile. When 
we increase simultaneously both φ and σ, then only those in the top decile increase working 
hours. To relate these results to empirical labour supply studies we give the values of the 
uncompensated elasticity, uE  and uncompensated elasticity uE 18
The optimum is typically characterized by a certain fraction of individuals, at the bottom 
end, choosing not to work (where we have dx/dn=dz/dn=0, there is bunching of individuals 
of different n). This is because their productivity is insufficient (wage rate) to compensate 
for the lost leisure (or non-employment activity) that working would entail. When φ is zero 
. We have calculated 
different measures for the extent of redistribution. In Tables 4-11 we show our RD-measure 
and the ratio between the guaranteed consumption and median consumption.    
 
                                                 
18  With the utility function (21) income effect is constant 
1
2
I
ϕ
= −
+
.  So the income effect is decreasing 
in φ. The compensated elasticity 
(1 )(1 )
(2 )
c yE
y
ϕ
ϕ
− +
=
+
 is decreasing with y. 
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there is very little bunching (e.g., in the case of Table 4 it turns out to be practically zero 
(F(no)=0.0003). With greater relativity concern bunching increases slightly 
  
In the case (σ=0.5 and φ=1 (table 4)) F(no)=0.015. Our numerical results reveal that the 
amount of bunching is quite sensitive to the greater inequality. When σ=0.7 and φ=1 (table 
6) the amount of bunching is 12 %, i.e., F(no)=0.12. When σ=0.5 (0.7) and φ=3 (table 8) 
the amount of bunching is 7% (22 %), i.e., F(no)=0.07 (=0.22). Hence the amount of 
bunching is very sensitive to the inherent inequality and much less to relativity.  
 
5.  Relativity and Inequality 
 
In this section we look at the interaction of inequality and the strength of relativity in 
determining the optimal tax schedule. We know that progressivity increases with greater 
relativity concern. (Figure 1). The greater relativity concern increases the marginal tax rates 
throughout and they increase more at the higher level of income. We also know, from 
Kanbur and Tuomala (1994), that progressivity increases with inequality (confirmed in 
Figure 2). To see how the impact of greater relativity affects progressivity at successively 
higher levels of pre-tax inequality, we have computed solutions for different parameter 
values of relative consumption concern φ given pre-tax inequality, and then repeated the 
exercise at a higher level of inequality.  From Figures 3 and 4 we see that the greater 
relativity increases progressivity but this impact is dampening with increasing inequality. 
Similarly, we can ask how the impact of greater inequality affects progressivity with 
greater strength of relativity.  From Figures 5 and 6 we see that the greater inequality 
increases progressivity but this impact on progressivity is in turn declining in an increase of 
relativity. Thus it seems that, in these numerical simulations at least, relativity and 
inequality do not compound each other’s incremental effect on progressivity. Further 
research is needed to understand the detailed nature of this result. 
 
Given the inherent complexities of optimal non-linear income taxation, it is not 
straightforward to develop an intuition for this result. But we can take the first steps 
towards understanding as follows. Suppose first the case with a fixed cake. If average 
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consumption increases by one Euro, individuals’ utilities go down as average consumption 
goes up. Lowering taxes increase average consumption and consequently lower utility, 
other things equal. Hence marginal tax rates should be higher than otherwise. With the 
utility function (25) there is a simple relationship between λ and γ:γ ϕλ= . Hence we see 
from (14) that an increase in φ increases marginal rates in the first best case. This is also 
true in the second best case at the endpoints of the distribution. Otherwise things are more 
complicated in the second best world. Let us now focus on the C-term in (14). This term 
measures the social welfare gain from slightly increasing the marginal tax rate at n and 
distributing as a poll subsidy to those below n the revenue raised from consequent increase 
in average tax rates above n. The first term in the integrand tends to favour rising marginal 
rates. The higher n, the lower is W’, the lower would be the marginal utility of 
consumption, xU . Hence at higher n the average value of  ( ' / (1 / )) /(1 )xW U Fλ γ λ+ −   is 
smaller and the whole term 1 ' / (1 / )xW U λ γ λ− +  is larger. With the utility function (25) 
this term becomes 11
xλ
− . So the direct effects of relativity concerns disappear. Without 
simulations it is not possible say how greater relativity concern changes λx. On the other 
hand an increase in pre-tax inequality affects λ, the marginal cost of public funds. Kanbur-
Tuomala (1993) shows the complications that can arise in signing the C-term as a function 
of mean preserving spreads in the distribution of n. 
  
Finally, how are these relationships in turn affected by the elasticity of labor supply? As 
shown in Tables 4-8 both compensated and uncompensated labour supply elasticities are 
decreasing with income in all cases displayed in Tables. At the upper part of the 
distribution the labour supply elasticities are declining with greater relativity and 
inequality. Unfortunately there is little empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
labour supply elasticities and wage rates19
                                                 
19 Röed and Ström (2002) (Table 1 and 2) offer a review of the existing more recent evidence. They conclude that 
the limited evidence indicates that labour supply elasticities are declining with household income. Using 
Norwegian data Aaberge-Colombino (2006) provides support for declining elasticities.  High labour supply 
elasticities among low-wage workers is also confirmed by empirical evaluations of various in-work benefit 
schemes operating in the US,  UK and some other countries. By contrast, there is empirical evidence on the 
elasticity of taxable income that higher elasticities are among high income individuals. See e.g. Gruber-Saez 
(2002).    
.  
 17 
The income effects enter through the terms A and C. In the term A20 it affects how elasticities 
vary with skill. As shown by Chetty (2006) there is a relationship between risk aversion and 
the labour supply. Or to put it another way there is the connection between the curvature of 
the utility function and the ratio of income and wage elasticities.21
x
xx
c U
nU
ny
by
=
∂∂
∂∂
/
/
  We can see this link by 
differentiating of the FOC of individual’s problem and using the Slutzky equation: 
                                                 (26)                                                                                                                          
 where cy  is a compensated labour supply and b is virtual income.  As seen from (26) the 
curvature of the utility function with respect to consumption (the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion) is important because the labour supply response to an increase in income is 
related to how much the marginal utility of consumption changes as income changes.  If 
xxU  is large, the marginal utility of consumption falls sharply as income rises, so that the 
taxpayer will reduce labour supply when his or her earnings rise. In fact this is the case 
here. We have assumed additively separable utility in comparison consumption (average 
consumption). This property rules out direct behavioural consequences in envy. But the 
utility function (25) does not abandon relativity effects on labour supply. The utility 
function (25) implies that xxU  is larger for low income people than high income people. 
Hence income effects make taxing less costly, encouraging labour supply for middle and 
upper income individuals, because taxes reduce after tax income, but make transfers more 
costly, discouraging labour supply for low-income individuals, because transfers increase 
after tax income. 
 
Therefore, holding other things constant, income effects lead to higher marginal rates at the 
upper end of the income distribution, allowing the government to redistribute more, but 
make redistribution at the low end more costly, and so the net effect on the level of 
transfers is ambiguous. If income effects are spread evenly throughout the distribution as in 
                                                 
20 The marginal utility of consumption, xU  and the term A in (14) has its origin in first order condition for 
labour supply (incentive compatibility condition). It shows the rate at which utility changes with n. The 
greater is xU  the more it changes as labour supply y is increased. 
21 See the formula (7) in Chetty (2006). 
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our case, then numerical simulations show that income effects allow the government to 
increase the level of transfers paid for by higher marginal rates across the distribution. 
 
The labour supply is much smaller below the median income than without relativity 
concerns. In simulations those above median in turn seem to work harder. As noted in 
footnote 13 the income effect is decreasing in φ. Now we see from (14) that given other 
things constant the lower the compensated elasticity the higher the optimal marginal 
income tax rate. This effect is increasing the level of marginal rates throughout compared 
with the case without relativity considerations. Income effects may be the most important 
reason why the greater inequality increases progressivity in the sense of increasing 
marginal rates but this impact is declining in an increase of relativity.  
  
In sum: To the extent that preferences are more relative than absolute, lower income 
individuals should gain more from redistribution than otherwise, but higher income 
individuals should lose more as well, so the net effect is ambiguous. Now holding the mean 
constant, if overall inequality increases, lower income individuals should gain even more 
from redistribution, but again higher earners should lose more, the net effect remains 
unclear. For these reasons simulations are needed. 
 
6.  Government’s and individuals’ preferences differ: Non-welfarism vs. welfarism 
 
It is not necessarily clear that the government ought to accept relative income concerns 
when forming its social objectives. The utility function governing individuals’ long-term 
welfare may be different from that of their short-term welfare. Perhaps a stronger case for 
paternalism could be built on the idea that the government is not willing to accept the 
consequences of relative income concerns. In other words market behavior is generated by 
one set of preferences, but society evaluates it with respect to another set of preferences. In 
many respects, the situation described above is fairly common in welfare and normative 
public economics. Perhaps the most well-known example is the analysis of so-called merit 
goods (Sandmo 1983). The consumption of these goods, in the viewpoint of the 
government, is meritorious and should be encouraged or imposed, ignoring individual 
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choice. Optimal taxation when the government attempts to alleviate poverty (e.g. Kanbur et 
al 1994a) is another application of a much larger literature on “non-welfarist” public 
economics, where the social planner explicitly uses some other criterion for evaluating an 
individual’s welfare than the preferences of that individual.  Perhaps at some level one 
could also argue that redistribution – where the government can evaluate individual welfare 
in a different way than the individuals themselves – and correction of externalities are 
additional examples in which the social welfare function differs from the individual utility.  
 
We assume now that the individual still maximises the same utility function (25) as in the 
previous section, but the government’s objective function rules out relativity effects. For 
example, individuals might benefit if an outsider induced them to behave according to 
preferences they wish they had.  
 
Our numerical simulations show (Figures 8 and 9) that the marginal tax rates are higher in 
the non-welfarist case than in the welfarist case up to the top decile of the income 
distribution. Above (below) the median hours worked are smaller (greater) in the non-
welfarist case than in the welfarist case (Figure 10). We also find that there is less 
redistribution in the non-welfarist case (RD=40%) than in the welfarist case (78%). The 
guaranteed income x(no) is smaller in the non-welfarist case than in the welfarist case. 
 
7.  Discussion and Conclusion 
  
As noted in the introduction, there are a few papers in the literature that have attempted to 
analyze the structure of optimal income taxation in the presence of relative concerns. How 
does our paper compare with these exercises? 
 
Boskin - Sheshinski (1978) construct an educational investment model in which the 
individual’s income is determined by his income and demonstrated that increased concern 
for relative consumption in the optimal linear income tax leads to larger lump sum 
subsidies and higher tax rates. Oswald (1983) studies a more general optimal non-linear tax 
problem in a world in which there is altruism and envy. He takes the standard utility 
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function as a function of consumption and leisure and adds a concern for consumption of 
others. He considers mainly the case where the comparison is average consumption (as we 
do here). Another simplifying assumption he makes is that envy (or altruism) has no effect 
on consumption decision and labour supply. With these assumptions and using a ceteris 
paribus argument he reaches the conclusion "...optimal marginal tax rates are higher in a 
predominantly jealous world."   
 
Ireland (2001) incorporates a social status-signalling mechanism into the Mirrlees model. 
In a model where individuals signal status with consumption, e.g. large houses, cars, boats 
etc., he finds status seeking leads to higher marginal tax rates, but not a more progressive 
rate structure.  His results are based on quasi-linear preferences, unbounded Pareto 
distribution and utilitarian social welfare function. So he confirms Diamond's (1998) result 
- the U-shaped marginal tax rate structure - with the unbounded Pareto distribution. Our use 
of a maximin objective eliminates the rising part of the U-shaped marginal tax rate 
structure. This is also the case when we assume a truncated Pareto distribution. Ireland 
does not discuss any other distributions. He does not compute numerical solutions in the 
case with income effects. In Ireland’s model status does not affect the endpoint results. 
Further, there is little empirical support for the Ireland formulation of status, which was not 
zero- sum.  
 
Thus our paper supports the conclusion in the literature that relativity leads to higher 
marginal tax rates. It both generalizes some of the conditions under which this result is 
obtained in the literature, and fleshes out the detailed structure for optimal marginal tax 
rates for specific functional forms of distribution, utility function, and social welfare 
function. By and large, we find support for greater progressivity, as we define it, in the tax 
structure as relativity concern increases. And none of the papers in the literature, to our 
knowledge, highlights the interplay of relativity and inequality in determining the optimal 
structure of taxes. We also explored what happens when the government does not accept 
the relative concerns of individuals and maximizes a non-welfarist objective function. 
More work is needed to further explore this interaction between relativity and inequality 
that our numerical simulations have uncovered.  
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Table 1 - Rawlsian  marginal tax rates (%) when people care about relative consumption     
                                                                  є =1/3 
 
  є =1/3 
 
є=1/2 
 
є=1/2 
 
є=1 
 
є=1 
 
Relative 
concern 
a=2 a=3 a=2 a=3 a=2 a=3 
φ=0 66.6 57 60 50 50 40 
φ =1/2 83.3 78.6 80 75 75 70 
 
 
 
 Table 2 - Rawlsian marginal tax rates (%) with the Champernowne distribution  
 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1 є=1 є=1 є=1 
 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 
F(n) θ=2 θ=2 θ=3 θ=3 θ=2 θ=2 θ=3 θ=3 
0.10 94.7 97.2 93.3 96.4 89.2 94.6 86.7 93.4 
0.20 91.5 95.6 85.9 92.5 83.2 91.6 73.8 86.9 
0.50 81.2 90.0 74.1 86.3 66.6 83.3 56.9 78.4 
0.75 79.8 86.3 66.1 82.1 56.9 78.4 47.4 73.7 
0.90 70.4 84.3 61.4 79.8 52.3 76.2 42.3 71.2 
0.95 69.2 83.7 60.0 79.1 50.9 75.5 41.0 70.5 
0.99 67.0 82.6 58.2 78.1 48.4 74.2 39.5 69.5 
0.999 58.7 78.4 52.2 75.1 39.9 69.2 33.5 66.8 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Rawlsian marginal tax rates (%) with the lognormal distribution   
 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1 є=1 є=1 є=1 
 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 
F(n) σ=0.7 σ=0.7 σ=0.39 σ=0.39 σ=0.7 σ=0.7 σ=0.39 σ=0.39 
0.10 93.4 96.7 89.4 94.7 87.8 93.9 80.8 90.4 
0.20 87.6 93.8 79.1 89.6 78.0 89.0 65.5 82.7 
0.50 77.7 88.9 65.9 82.9 63.6 81.8 49.1 74.6 
0.75 68.2 84.1 55.0 77.5 51.7 75.8 37.9 68.9 
0.90 61.5 80.7 46.9 73.5 44.4 72.2 30.7 65.9 
0.95 59.5 78.7 43.8 71.9 30.2 71.1 28.1 64.0 
0.99 51.7 75.8 36.9 68.5 34.9 67.4 22.6 61.3 
0.999 47.5 73.8 31.7 65.9 31.1 65.6 18.8 59.4 
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Table 4 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ =0     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Ec Eu 
0.10 0.32 0.06 0.09  -50 30 1.06 0.56 
0.50 0.41 0.15 0.15  -4 29 0.72 0.22 
0.90 0.46 0.32 0.28   13 26 0.59 0.09 
0.99 0.48 0.57 0.47   18 23 0.54 0.04 
P(90/10)  5.33 3.11     
RD%   41.7     
F(no)=0.0003,  x(n0)=0.05,  x(n0)/x(median)=0.33 
 
Table 5 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ =1     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.10 0.22 0.04 0.13  -202 58 2.03 2.36 
0.50 0.41 0.15 0.17  -14 60 0.67 0.95 
0.90 0.53 0.37 0.26   30 61 0.26 0.59 
0.99 0.59 0.68 0.38   44 60 0.13 0.46 
P(90/10)  9.25 2.0     
RD%   78.4     
F(no)=0.015,  x(n0)=0.11, x(n0)/x(median)=0.65 
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Table 6 
β= 0 σ=0.7 R= 0.0 φ =1     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.12 0.01 0.001 0.13      - 61   
0.50 0.34 0.14 0.17    -38 65 0.96 1.29 
0.90 0.51 0.48 0.28     39 68 0.31 0.64 
0.99 0.60 1.06 0.48     55 67 0.11 0.44 
P(90/50)  3.4 1.64     
RD%   51.8     
F(no)=0.12,   x(n0)=0.125, x(n0)/x(median)=0.7 
 
Table 7 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ=3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.10 0.11 0.02 0.15  -643 78   
0.50 0.41 0.15 0.18    -20 79 0.95 1.15 
0.90 0.58 0.40 0.23     42 80 0.38 0.58 
0.99 0.66 0.76 0.30     60 81 0.21 0.41 
P(90/50)  2.66 1.66     
RD%   37.6     
F(no)=0.07,    x(n0)=0.14,  x(n0)/x(median)=0.78 
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Table 8 
β= 0 σ=0.7 R= 0.0  φ =3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.22 0.01 0.001 0.16       - 81   
0.50 0.30 0.11 0.18    -64 82 1,66  1.86 
0.90 0.56 0.50 0.25     51 84 0.42 0.63 
0.99 0.67 1.21 0.36     71 85 0.19 0.39 
P(90/50)  4.54 1.56     
RD%   66.0     
F(no)=0.22,  x(n0)=0.16, x(n0)/x(median)=0.89 
 
Table 9 - Champernowne distribution 
β= 0 θ=3 R= 0.0  φ =3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.12 0.01 0.002 0.16       - 79   
0.50 0.37 0.14 0.18    -33 80 1.06 1.36 
0.90 0.55 0.42 0.24     44 83 0.45 0.65 
0.99 0.65 1.06 0.34     68 85 0.23 0.43 
P(90/50)  2.8 1.33     
RD%   52.5     
F(no)=0.117 , x(n0)=0.155, x(n0)/x(median)=0.86 
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Table 10 - Champernowne distribution 
β= 0 θ=2 R= 0.0  φ =3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.38 0.01 0.001 0.18       - 84   
0.50 0.15 0.06 0.19    -228 85  4.32 4.52 
0.90 0.51 0.56 0.25     55 88 0.57 0.77 
0.99 0.69 1.06 0.44     69 90 0.16 0.36 
P(90/50)  9.33 1.32     
RD%    85     
F(no)=0.38,  x(n0)=0.178, x(n0)/x(median)=0.93 
 
Table 11 - Non-welfarism 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ =1     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.10 0.33 0.06 0.09  -202 58 1.02 1.35 
0.50 0.42 0.15 0.16  -14 60 0.59 0.92 
0.90 0.46 0.32 0.29   30 61 0.45 0.78 
0.99 0.49 0.57 0.48   44 60 0.36 0.69 
P(90/10)  5.33 3.22     
RD%   39.7     
F(no)=0.01,  x(n0)=0.09, x(n0)/x(median)=0.56 
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Figure 1a - (1-F(n)/nf(n):  Champernowne distribution  
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Figure 1b - (1-F(n)/nf(n):  Lognormal distribution 
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Figure 2 - (σ=0.5) 
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Figure 3 - (φ=1) 
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Figure 4 - (φ=3) 
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Figure 5 - (σ=0.5) 
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Figure 6 - (σ=0.7) 
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Figure 7 - Marginal tax rates β=0, R=0.0 (X/Z=1) f(n)= lognormal (-1.0,0.5) 
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Figure 8 - Marginal tax rates  β=1, R=0.0 (X/Z=1) f(n)=lognormal (-1.0 ,0.7) 
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Figure 9 - Marginal tax rates  β=1, R=0.0 (X/Z=1.0) f(n)=lognormal (-1.0 ,0.5) 
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Figure 10 - Labour supply (0-100), β=1, R=0.0 (X/Z=1.0) f(n)=lognormal (-1.0,0.5) 
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